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Abstract
European climate polices acknowledge the role that energy communities can play in the energy
transition. Self-consumption installations shared among those living in the same building are a
good example of such energy communities. In this work, we perform a regional analysis of optimal
self-consumption installations under the new legal framework recently passed in Spain. Results
show that the optimal sizing of the installation leads to economic savings for self-consumers in all
the territory, for both options with and without remuneration for energy surplus. A sensitivity
analysis on technology costs revealed that batteries still require noticeably cost reductions to be
cost-effective in a behind the meter self-consumption environment. In addition, solar compensation
mechanisms make batteries less attractive in a scenario of low PV costs, since feeding PV surplus
into the grid, yet less efficient, becomes more cost-effective. An improvement for the current
energy surplus remuneration policy was proposed and analysed. It consists in the inclusion of the
economic value of the avoided power losses in the remuneration.
1 Introduction
Energy communities are key to address the challenge of climate change. The strategy of the
European Union (EU) for 2020-2030, defined in the “Clean energy for all Europeans” package,
acknowledges the need for regulatory frameworks which empowers renewable-based self-consumers
(also referred to as prosumers) to generate, consume, store, and sell electricity back to the grid.
Several advantages can result from the massive deployment of renewable distributed resources
(DR) for self-consumption. First, it increases the use of renewable energy sources (RES) in elec-
tricity supply, leading to reductions in greenhouse gases emissions. At a technical level, local gen-
eration reduces power losses, while deferring future investments in transmission and distribution
infrastructure. From the financial point of view, self-consumption deployment entails additional re-
sources stemming mostly from consumers, which helps diversifying centralised energy investments.
At the socioeconomic level, distributed generation increases the number of actors that share the
benefits associated with the electricity generation activity, historically concentrated in a reduced
number of large companies. Additionally, since it is generally accepted that self-consumption will
be mostly based on PV systems, it is worth mentioning that distributed PV is associated with
higher rates of jobs creation per MW than other energy sources, including large-scale PV [1].
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In recent years, the transposition at a national level of European directives related to the
Clean energy for all Europeans package translates into new national legal frameworks, including
the notion of self-consumption and energy communities [2]. This implied a radical change in Spain,
as previous legislation was a sheer obstacle for self-consumption [3, 4], and poorly rated in many
international comparison studies [5, 6]. However, the recent Royal Decree 244/2019 [7] ended the
taxation of self-consumed energy, introduced remuneration mechanisms for the excess production,
and defined the conditions for creating energy communities.
Self-consumption and energy communities allow increasing the renewable penetration in the
residential sector. In addition, self-consumption incentives electrification of residential uses, replac-
ing in some cases the local use of natural gas, thus improving air quality in urban environments.
In Spain, the residential sector represented 18% of the country final energy consumption in 2017
[8]. Figure 1 depicts residential final energy consumption according to energy sources, showing
that about 69% originated from non-renewable resources. In addition, only 39% was covered with
electricity. These two facts support the notion that both self-consumption deployment and the
electrification of residential uses represent key tools in the design of energy policies.
Figure 1: Final energy consumption in the residential sector in Spain (2017), broken down accord-
ing to energy source. Source: [8].
In this article, we analyse the PV self-consumption in Spain under the new legal framework,
with special focus on energy communities. The aim of this study is to reveal the direct economic
impact for self-consumers of the new legislation package. This enables discussing whether support
schemes from public institutions are required in order to obtain the aforementioned advantages of
self-consumption besides private economic savings. The regional analysis performed in this work
provides an answer to this question with higher spatial resolution, which is coherent with the fact
that regions in Spain have some degree of autonomy regarding environmental and energy policies,
including promotion schemes. Thus, it is important to understand whether or not the different
solar radiation and electricity consumption levels among Spanish regions deserve local policies to
encompass self-consumption cost-effectiveness at national level. Finally, we also identify a number
of drawbacks of the new legal framework, and propose specific modifications accompanied by an
economic assessment.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. A literature review is performed in Section 2,
revealing some limitations that are addressed in this work. Section 3 describes the main char-
acteristics of the new legal framework for self-consumption in Spain. This framework is later
considered in the simulations and the analysis of this study. Section 4 includes a description of
the techno-economical optimisation tool used in this work, together with the different databases
considered. In Section 5, results for the optimal self-consumption installation at the regional level
are presented, for both cases with and without remuneration for energy surplus. A sensitivity
analysis on the relevant economic factors (PV and storage technology costs, discount rate and PV
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panel lifetime) is conducted in Section 6. In Section 7 we discuss the remuneration policy, and a
proposal for improving economic efficiency is analysed. The paper ends with the main conclusions
gathered in Section 8.
2 Literature review
Self-consumption has been drawing increasingly attention in the scientific community mostly over
the last few years. A review on the topic from 2015 concluded that the number of papers was
limited at that time, and more comparative studies were needed to assess its potential [9]. Since
then, many works addressing case studies in different countries and discussing current and potential
policies for self-consumption promotion have been published. However, the astonishing reduction
in PV and storage costs experienced in the last years, together with the need for increased ambition
in energy transition plans for period 2020-2030, call for a continuous update of the research in the
field. In particular, a number of works considering the case study of Spain presented conclusions
that are no longer valid, as the legal framework around self-consumption has dramatically changed.
For example, [10] analysed the economic performance of a PV installation at the university of Jaen
(southern Spain). Results showed an average Levelised Cost of Energy around 125 e/MWh, and
a payback time of 17.5 years. The analysis performed in [4] considered data from a real case
study in Madrid region, consisting in a household PV installation of 2.5 kW, and no storage.
The authors concluded that the former regulation was highly unfavourable for the deployment of
self-consumption installations, given the small savings obtained.
At the international level, several works reported the economic feasibility of self-consumption
in the residential sector in a context of electricity market without subsidies [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. The
positive effect in self-consumption when including different strategies for electric vehicle charging
was analysed in [16]. [17] analysed how heterogeneity in real-world electricity load profiles af-
fects the optimal system configuration and the cost-effectiveness of self-consumption systems in
Zurich (Switzerland). Based on real energy consumption profiles, the authors found that system
cost-effectiveness varied considerably between households, even for households with comparable
total annual demand. While self-consumption without subsidies was profitable for 40% of the
households, batteries were not cost-effective in more than 99% of the cases, unless storage prices
dropped to a range of 250−500 e/kWh. [18] considered three real installations in Peru to analyse
two different financial frameworks: one based on a lease contract and other considering a residen-
tial owner. While cost-competitiveness varied between the installations, the need for reducing the
cost of capital was identified as a clear means to increase economic feasibility.
Based on the reviewed works, we have identified a number of issues and limitations when
assessing the performance of self-consumption in households. The following list includes a brief
description of them, so that it can be useful for future researchers. A comment on how each of
them is addressed in this paper is also included.
• PV costs have experienced a sharp decrease in a relatively short period of time [19, 20]. Since
technology cost is a main driver of self-consumption cost-effectiveness, updated figures and
sensitivity analyses are required. Table 1 gathers PV unitary costs assumed in the reviewed
literature, broken down according to components where available.1 In this work, updated
costs for small PV installations in Spain are employed (see details in Section 4), significantly
lower than those referred in the table.
• Cost-effectiveness of self-consumption depends to a large extent on the optimal sizing of
the installation [21]. Ad hoc decisions on the design parameters may lead to suboptimal
results and underestimations of the self-consumption potential. This could be the case in
some works that assumed predefined parameters, such as PV capacities [11, 12, 14, 15] or the
percentage of PV shared in consumption [3, 11]. While it is true that PV capacities obtained
1Usually, an overall PV cost is reported (including inverter, structure, labour costs). Details provided on
disaggregated costs are included in the last column of the table.
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Reference PV unitary cost [e/kW] Comment
[3] 2, 070 Residential
[11] 1, 800− 2, 000 Facility size 3-20 kW
[12] 2, 090 − 3, 330(a) Facility size < 10 kW
[13] 1, 130 +1, 330 e for installation
[14] 1, 500− 1, 660 Facility size 0.5-4 kW
[15] 1, 700− 1, 900 Facility size 2-10 kW
[16] 1, 600 Inverter included (200-300 e/kW)
[17] 2, 000 -
[21] 1, 200− 2, 000 -
[22] 1, 130 PV: 550 e/kW, structure: 340 e/kW, inverter: 240 e/kW
(a) Conversion factor (2016): 0.9508 USD/e.
Table 1: Unitary PV cost for self-consumption facilities considered in different works.
from a techno-economic optimisation cannot be exactly matched by combining real-world
available PV panels, in our opinion this is a practical issue to be addressed in a real project.
At the research level, the use of predefined arbitrary PV capacities should be avoided. In
this analysis, the sizing of the installation is an output of a techno-economical optimisation.
• Some of the reviewed analyses consider real-world self-consumption facilities [4, 6, 10, 18].
Conclusions obtained in these cases should be taken with care, as the considered case studies
may not be representative of the majority of potential self-consumers. In this work, average
household buildings are obtained for every region in Spain. Each average building is char-
acterised by the average number of households, floors, annual electricity consumption and
rooftop surface (see 4.2).
• Another issue in self-consumption analysis is the availability of data, specially load profiles
and electricity price profiles. Load profiles are key in determining the overlapping between
solar generation and electricity consumption, and the exchange dynamics with the grid.
According to the review included in [17], in most cases a single or a few number of measured
household demand profiles are considered. Concerning electricity prices, a constant value
related to average market price is often assumed for every hour of the year [4, 12, 13]. This
could be realistic in some places where retail prices are constant or vary according to a
reduced number of periods. However, this situation is likely to change completely in the
following years. Generally accepted guidelines for electricity markets in a context of high
penetration of renewables agree on translating price signals to consumers in order to promote
demand-side management. In Spain it is possible for retail consumers to pay the electricity
according to the hourly electricity market. In this work, we use hourly electricity prices, and
the best estimate of the load profile for households with hourly resolution for a whole year,
which is published by the Spanish Transmission System Operator (TSO), see 4.2 for details.
3 Overview of current regulatory framework in Spain
Up to April 2019, the deployment of self-consumption installations was seriously hindered in
Spain. The initial and prolonged lack of legislation led out to a regulatory scheme that discour-
aged self-consumption by establishing very restrictive and economically detrimental conditions for
such installations, contrary to what happened in several other countries [5]. Finally, the recent
enactment of Royal Decree 244/2019 (RD 244 from hereon) [7] has established a regulatory frame-
work that enables the deployment of domestic rooftop PV installations in the country. The new
legislation eliminates the sadly famous “Sun tax”, i.e., the tax imposed on the PV generation
that is instantaneously consumed locally. Moreover, under RD 244, energy exported to the grid is
economically rewarded and self-consumption installations shared by several consumers are allowed.
The current regulation identifies two kinds of installations: without and with electricity surplus.
Installations belonging to the former do not export any electricity to the distribution grid. Hence,
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they are considered mere consumers. The latter is in turn divided into two categories: those not
receiving any compensation for the exported electricity and those rewarded. Installations whose
capacity is higher than 100 kW belong to the first category and their electricity production must
be exchanged in the wholesale market. This paper focuses on installations within the second
category, i.e., those exporting electricity surplus and being remunerated for that. This includes
household installations with a few kilowatts capacity, as well as larger systems supplying electricity
to services or industrial buildings.
On the one hand, the owners of a self-consumption installation pay the electricity imported
from the grid, at times when PV generation is lower than demand, at the usual price. In Spain,
consumers can select either to sign a contract with a private electricity retailer or select one of
the designated companies with a government-fixed price (PVPC, Voluntary Price for Small Con-
sumers). On the other hand, the electricity exported to the grid, at times when PV generation
exceeds local demand, is rewarded at a price that depends on the wholesale market price, as de-
scribed in Section 7. Every month, the retailer charges the consumer the resulting net amount,
together with capacity-dependent costs and taxes. Net balance cannot be negative. If the remu-
neration for the electricity exported to the grid is greater than the cost of the imported electricity,
balance is zero and, in practice, the consumer is giving away the excess of generation at no cost.
Additionally, RD 244 allows nearby consumers to share one single installation. Shared in-
stallations must fulfil any of the following conditions: consumers shall be connected to the same
low-voltage grid (downstream the MV/LV transformer), the distance between consumers’ proper-
ties shall be lower than 500 m, or their registry numbers must share the initial 14 digits. Consumers
within a shared installation must select fixed-in-time sharing coefficients2, which determine how
the PV generation is distributed among them. As a final remark, the current legislation establishes
that, for any kind of self-consumption installation, the user and the owner of the facility might be
a different natural or legal person.
4 Data and methods
The analysis presented in this work combines different data from a number of databases. These
data are inputs for the Distributed Energy Resources Customer Adoption Model (DER-CAM),
a computational tool for techno-economical optimisation. DER-CAM determines the parameters
of the optimal self-consumption installation under certain constraints, and generates the main
performance indices.
4.1 The optimisation tool: DER-CAM
The Distributed Energy Resources Customer Adoption Model, developed by Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory (LBNL), is one of the world’s most popular software tools for economic plan-
ning of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) in behind-the-meter and microgrid environments
[23, 24].3
Considering the specific conditions of a building (location, weather information, electric load,
etc.) DER-CAM is able to calculate the optimal portfolio of DER investments (photovoltaic, diesel
generators, storage technologies, etc.) that minimises the overall energy costs for the consumer.
In this economic optimisation, DER-CAM takes into account techno-economic data of distributed
generation technologies (including capital costs, operation, and maintenance costs; electric effi-
ciency; maximum operating hours among others) as well as electricity tariffs and fuel costs. Due
2The Spanish legislator has announced that this will be modified soon to allow time-dependent sharing coeffi-
cients. This could be beneficial for shared installations among consumers with very different consumption patterns
such as small businesses and households.
3The original version of DER-CAM can be accessed at no cost in:
https://building-microgrid.lbl.gov/projects/der-cam
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to the difference of lifetimes across DER technologies, the Equivalent Annual Cost (EAC), includ-
ing annualised investment costs and operation costs, is the objective function that is minimised.
Batteries are operated in a daily cycle, by imposing that the state of charge at the end of the
day is the same as in the beginning of the day. The optimisation problem is formulated assuming
perfect foresight for the input data during the following day, which is a reasonable hypothesis,
provided that electricity prices are known the day before, and solar radiation can be reasonable
predicted.
For the purpose of the analysis of this paper, a DER-CAM version focusing on PV and stor-
age technologies, and capturing the impact of battery ageing, was used [25]. The investments in
DER capacity (i.e. PV and storage) are disaggregated from the investments in power electronic
components, such the battery controller and the inverter. Additionally, specific behind the meter
constraints modelling the current regulatory framework imposed by RD 244 in Spain were intro-
duced (in particular, a constraint limiting the amount of exported electricity to the grid that is
economically compensated, see Section 7).
4.2 Databases
The different databases employed in the analysis represent the most up-to-date relevant data
available at the moment for research purposes. These are:
• Population and housing census (2011) [26]. This census is conducted in Spain every ten
years by the Spanish Statistical Office. Two relevant parameters have been derived from this
database: average building floor area, S, and average number of households per building,
H , at the regional level, as well as the national average, Table 2.
• Data from electricity consumers published by the Spanish independent regulator organism
(CNMC) [27] and the Spanish institute for energy efficiency (IDAE) [28]. These data have
been employed to estimate:
– The average annual electricity consumption per household for every region in Spain, C,
Table 2.
– The share of consumers at a national level with the different time discrimination options:
A (no time discrimination): 74.74%; DHA (two periods): 25.19%; and DHS (three
periods): 0.07%.
• Hourly profiles of final electricity consumption (2018) [29]. These profiles are published by
Red Ele´ctrica de Espan˜a (REE), the Spanish Transmission System Operator (TSO). They
represent the best estimation on how the electricity consumption is distributed over the
different hours of the year for consumers in low voltage, for the different time discrimination
options. In this work, profiles for consumers with a contracted power below 15 kW were
employed to generate the daily load profile of the average building for week and weekend
days, for every month, and for every region in Spain.
• Hourly electricity prices for consumers (Voluntary Price for Small Consumers, PVPC) for
2018, published by REE [30]. Under the PVPC scheme, the hourly electricity market price
is directly translated to the consumer. Figure 2 shows the PVPC for two months and for
consumers without discrimination (A), two-period discrimination (DHA), and the averaged
profile for the energy community (the average building). The PVPC includes the energy
component of the access tariff, as described later in Figure 7.
• Solar radiation time series have been produced using the Climate Forecast System Reanalysis
(CFSR) database [31], as described in [32]. CFSR database includes hourly resolution and
40 × 40 km2 spatial resolution. For every region in Spain, grid cells within the region are
averaged to obtain representative time series. Figure 3 shows the annual capacity factor for
every region (averaged over the 39 years of available data). Hourly time series are used to
create a representative day for every month that is used as input for the optimisation.
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Region S (m2) H C (kWh)
Galicia 98.8 2.1 4,208
Asturias 193.6 3.3 5,637
Cantabria 197.0 3.2 3,922
Basque Country 162.6 6.8 5,080
Navarra 128.0 2.7 5,332
Rioja 151.0 3.2 3,279
Aragon 132.6 2.7 4,551
Catalonia 120.2 3.4 4,074
Castilla y Leo´n 92.6 2.0 3,246
Madrid 167.8 5.3 2,933
Extremadura 128.1 1.6 2,938
Castilla la Mancha 116.2 1.6 3,080
Valencia 131.2 3.1 2,756
Balearic Islands 114.3 2.4 3,203
Andalusia 102.8 2.2 3,030
Murcia 153.7 2.1 3,425
Canary Islands 119.5 2.4 2,889
NATIONAL 112.9 2.7 3,487
Table 2: Regional and national average building. S: Average building floor area; H : Average
households per building; C: Average household annual electricity consumption.
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Figure 2: Electricity price given by PVPC tariff, considered for March and September, for options
A (without time discrimination), DHA (with time discrimination) and for the average building.
The latter is estimated based on the proportion of consumers in low voltage with discrimination
options A, DHA and DHS, detailed in the text.
4.3 Cost assumptions
Tables 3 and 4 contain the values adopted for a number of techno-economic parameters. Instal-
lation cost for rooftop PV system is assumed at 1,080 e/kW. This is similar to 1,127 e/kW
estimated in Vartainen et al. [33], 1,100 e/kW shown for Germany in [34], and 1,070 e/kW esti-
mated for 2020 in the Danish Energy Agency Database [35]. Out of the total cost, we assume 1/3
(360 e/kW) for the modules and 2/3 (720 e/kW) for the Balance of System. In turn, Balance of
System comprises the cost of the inverter estimated at 360 e/kW and the rest of elements (struc-
ture, wiring, labour) which are also estimated at 360 e/kW. The cost split is based on current
prices for PV rooftop installations in Spain and roughly in agreement with the evolution of rooftop
systems in Germany [34]. The capacity of the inverter is set so that the DC/AC capacity is equal
to 1.2 as this is the common practice when designing household PV systems [36].
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Figure 3: Capacity factors representative for every region in Spain. Average values over the 39
years of available data are shown. Grey dots indicate the spatial resolution of the reanalysis
database from which solar radiation is retrieved.
Several battery technologies have been considered in order to devise the most suitable trade-
off between cost and ageing parameter in the optimisation problem. The ageing parameter of the
battery represents the maximum number of cycles divided by the battery lifetime. The adopted
values are based on [25] and [37]. The battery technology costs were considered to be between
335 and 667 e/kWh, depending on the technology. These values are in line with the current
decreasing trajectories of storage technology costs [38].
Conservative assumptions have been made regarding the PV lifetime of 20 years, as many
authors consider 25 years [14, 15, 18, 21, 22] or even 30 [4]. The discount rate was set according to
the national debt funding costs at the moment of the research, which was 1.85% for 15 years loan
and 2.7% for 30 years. Sensitivity analyses on both PV lifetime and discount rate are performed
in Section 6.
PV Panel 360 e/kW
Installation+labour costs 360 e/kW
Lifetime 20 years
Rooftop occupation factor 10 m2/kW
Inverter Unitary cost 360 e/kW
Efficiency 0.93
Lifetime 10 years
Battery Unitary cost See Table 4
Ageing parameter See Table 4
Lifetime 8 years
Minimum state of charge 5%
Max. Charging rate 0.5 hours−1
Max. Discharging rate 0.5 hours−1
Efficiency (charge) 0.95
Efficiency (discharge) 0.95
Controller Fix cost 50 e
Unitary cost 60 e/kW
Efficiency 0.95
Other Discount rate 2%
Table 3: Techno-economic input parameters for the reference case.
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Type of battery Unitary Ageing
cost parameter
Lithium iron phosphate 408 e/kWh 562
Lithium titanate 668 e/kWh 844
Lithium Manganese Oxide 335 e/kWh 131
Lithium Nickel Cobalt Aluminium Oxide 384 e/kWh 394
Lithium Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide 392 e/kWh 225
Table 4: Different types of batteries considered.
4.4 Performance indicators
Results provided by DER-CAM include which elements are present in the installation (PV and/or
storage), the optimal sizing that minimises the EAC, and the fraction of available rooftop oc-
cupied by the facility. Time series with hourly power flow (i.e. generated PV power, battery
charge/discharge power, etc.) for week and week-end days for every month are also reported.
Figure 4 illustrates an example of the power flow for an installation including PV and batteries.
The dispatch of storage output, storage input and PV sales is such that imported electricity oc-
curs at minimum market price and exported electricity take place when remuneration is maximum
(remuneration is related to market price, as described in Section 7; market price is known the day
before).
4 8 12 16 20 24
Hour
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
kW
Load
PV generation
Imported from
the grid
Battery discharge
Battery charge
Exported to
the grid
Figure 4: Example of one-day power flow computed with DER-CAM, for a self-consumption
installation with storage and with remuneration for energy surplus.
The performance of the self-consumption installation is characterised by the following indices:
• Annualised savings ratio (ASR), defined as the percentage of reduction in EAC compared
to a case without self-consumption facility. Mathematically:
ASR = 100
EAC noPV − EACPV
EAC noPV
. (1)
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It is worth noting that, for example, ASR=5% does not mean that consumers pay 5% less in
their electricity bill as a consequence of the initial investment required for the installation.
It means that consumers pay 5% less including both the electricity bills and the annualised
initial investment. Thus, in practice, the percentage of reduction in the electricity bill would
be higher.
• Self-sufficiency ratio (SSR). According to [9, 17], SSR is defined as the percentage of annual
load covered by PV and batteries, computed annually. In Figure 4, SSR is the PV generation
below the load line plus the storage output divided by the total load. 100-SSR represents
the percentage of annual load covered with electricity imported from the grid.
• Self-consumption ratio (SCR). According to [9, 17], SCR is defined as the share of generated
solar energy that covers the load directly or via the battery. In Figure 4, SCR is the PV
generation below the load line plus the storage output divided by the total PV generation.
100-SCR represents the percentage of generated solar energy exported to the grid.
• Exported-imported ratio (EIR), defined as the ratio between the energy exported to the
grid and the energy imported from the grid. This ratio is important in order to check if an
optimal installation is determined by the legal constraint regarding the amount of electricity
that can be exported. Note that the ratio can be larger than 100% (meaning that the amount
of exported energy is larger than the imported energy), as the constraint refers the economic
value of exported/imported energy (see Section 7).
For the cases not considering remuneration for the energy surplus, SCR and EIR will not be
reported, as they take trivial values (100% and 0%, respectively) because there is no electricity
injection into the grid.
5 Regional analysis of self-consumption in buildings
The datasets and the computational tool described in Section 4 have been employed to analyse the
performance of the optimal self-consumption installation, including PV and storage technologies,
for the average building in every region of Spain. The main results are gathered in Table 5 for
installations without remuneration for the energy surplus and with remuneration, according to
RD 244.
Results show that self-consumption installations in household buildings entail economic savings
for consumers in all the regions, as compared to a situation without self-consumption. It is also
noticed that, under the considered assumptions, storage is not part of the optimal configuration
in any region, regardless the solar compensation policy.
Considering the case without compensation for energy surplus, the installed PV capacity is,
on average, 1 kW per household. The optimal installation covers a reasonably low percentage
of the building rooftop in most cases (less than 22% in all regions, except for Basque Country,
where the percentage scales up to 45%), meaning that the installation would be compatible with
the presence of antennas or lifts, and shadowed areas would be relatively easy to avoid. The
self-consumption ratio (SSR) ranges from 30% to 36%. Since there is no remuneration for energy
surplus, the optimal installation is sized so that the energy surplus is negligible. Concerning
the Annualised Savings Ratio (ASR), it ranges from 11% to 19%, depending on the region. A
significant difference is observed between the northern regions with a lower solar resource (Galicia,
Basque Country, Asturias and Cantabria), for which the average ASR is of around 12%, notably
lower than the average of the rest of the regions (17.5%). However, the PV penetration obtained in
northern regions is still relevant (SSR above 30% in all cases). This means that the environmental
and social positive effects of self-consumption could also be obtained in northern regions, but the
smaller cost-effectiveness could reduce the intensity of private investments, provided that self-
consumption installations require that almost all the investment is taken in the first year.
Under the surplus compensation scheme, the installed PV capacity increases notably, reaching,
on average, 2.7 kW of PV capacity per household. The PV penetration increases accordingly, with
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No remuneration With remuneration
Region PV/hh Rooftop ASR SSR PV/hh Rooftop ASR SSR SCR EIR
(kW) (%) (%) (%) (kW) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Galicia 1.23 18.5 13.8 32.4 2.58 38.8 17.6 41.7 60.6 52.6
Asturias 1.69 19.9 12.2 31.3 2.88 33.9 14.9 39.3 72.3 27.4
Cantabria 1.17 13.2 11.3 30.4 1.97 22.1 13.8 38.5 73.6 24.8
Basque Country 1.53 44.9 11.2 30.5 2.52 73.8 13.5 38.3 75.0 22.8
Navarra 1.50 22.1 14.4 32.3 3.82 56.5 19.0 42.7 52.3 78.4
Rioja 0.94 14.0 15.4 33.6 2.63 39.4 21.1 43.6 46.7 103.7
Aragon 1.26 17.8 17.4 35.1 3.53 50.2 25.7 44.0 44.9 114.2
Catalonia 1.13 22.1 17.0 34.9 3.16 61.8 24.5 43.8 45.4 110.9
C. Leon 0.89 13.3 16.3 33.7 2.43 36.4 23.8 43.8 47.5 100.7
Madrid 0.78 17.2 18.0 35.0 2.16 47.3 27.5 44.1 45.7 110.9
Extremadura 0.81 06.9 18.3 35.8 2.24 19.1 27.6 44.5 44.8 116.9
C. Mancha 0.83 08.1 18.1 35.3 2.37 23.0 27.4 44.4 44.6 117.7
Valencia 0.75 12.4 18.3 35.8 2.10 34.5 27.2 44.4 44.9 116.0
Balearic islands 0.87 12.6 16.3 33.8 2.37 34.2 24.0 43.4 47.0 101.5
Andalusia 0.83 12.4 18.8 36.1 2.28 34.1 28.6 44.6 44.6 118.1
Murcia 0.92 08.6 18.8 36.1 2.60 24.3 28.4 44.5 44.3 119.7
Canary islands 0.76 10.9 19.8 36.6 2.25 32.2 31.9 45.1 42.1 135.5
NATIONAL 1.00 16.4 16.2 34.5 2.73 45.0 22.8 44.0 46.7 105.4
Table 5: Performance of optimal self-consumption installations for regional and national average
buildings.
SSR of around 44%, and the annualised savings scale up to near 23% in average. Almost half of
the generated PV electricity is exported, as indicated by SSR ratios near 50%. In many regions
(with special emphasis in southern regions), the exported energy is larger than the imported
energy (EIR> 100%), suggesting that the sizing of the optimal installation could be determined
by the legal constraint concerning the amount of electricity that can be exported monthly with
compensation, see description in Section 3. The fraction of rooftop covered by the installation
also increases, with the national average reaching around 45%.
6 Sensitivity analyses
The reference case analysed in Section 5 assumes a number of technical and economical hypotheses
that impact the obtained results. In this section, we aim at studying how the optimal configuration,
sizing and performance of a self-consumption facility vary according to several parameters, such
as the technology costs, the discount rate and the PV panel lifetime. The analyses are performed
for the national average building, and considering the case without energy surplus compensation
and with compensation according to RD 244.
6.1 PV and battery costs
The technology costs (for PV panels and batteries) is of interest to analyse, as the current and
future decreasing trends [33] may redefine the whole scenario for countries to implement energy
transitions. For the case of PV panels, a significant decrease of costs have been experienced over
the last decade, for example making PV one of the most competitive energy sources worldwide,
and paving the way for a massification of small-scale installations under appropriate conditions.
Regarding storage technologies, while a certain cost reduction has already been observed, efforts
are being placed in reaching further decreases, especially due to the critical role that batteries
could play in decarbonising mobility [38, 39].
In this analysis “PV costs” include PV panel, inverter and installation costs. The reason for
this is to facilitate comparison with other works, where an aggregated cost is usually reported.
The considered range in this sensitivity analysis goes from 600 e/kW to 1,450 e/kW. Concerning
battery costs, the considered range includes cost reductions from -40% to -75% with respect to the
reference cost of e/kWh. This range was found to be the appropriate one so that batteries are
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included in some of the optimal configurations. Since the optimal battery selected in all the cases
is the Lithium-Nickel-Cobalt-Aluminium-Oxide battery, the battery costs vary from 230 e/kWh
to 96 e/kWh. This is coherent with previous works, that concluded that actual battery costs
are too high to be considered as a cost-effective option [14, 17, 40]. In particular, [17] predicted
storage prices in the range 250-500 e/kWh in Switzerland for storage to become cost-effective,
and [40] concluded that storage prices should be below 200 e/kWh in Germany.
6.1.1 Case 1: No compensation for energy surplus
Figure 5 shows the different results obtained depending on the assumed PV and battery costs.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis of technology costs for case “No compensation for energy surplus”.
Purple and cyan areas indicate that the optimal solutions comprise only PV panels, and PV panels
plus batteries, respectively. Yellow iso-lines refer to the metric indicate in the title of the plot.
Two areas can be observed in the plots presented in Figure 5, one corresponding to optimal
installations including only PV panels (in purple) and other comprising PV panels and battery
(in cyan). For the considered ranges of PV and battery costs, self-consumption installations
imply always annualised savings for consumers. Otherwise, a third region without PV panels and
batteries would appear in the plots.
Interestingly, it is possible to observe that the installation of storage increases as the PV costs
decrease. This is due to the fact that lower PV costs lead to high PV capacities and, therefore,
more energy surplus. Since no remuneration for exported energy is considered in this case, the
potential benefit of storage increases, making batteries more cost-effective.
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Focusing on the area of chart without storage, the optimal PV capacity is around 1 kW per
household (as seen on the top-right panel), and it increases slightly when PV costs decrease.
Consequently, the self-sufficient ratio slightly decreases (the installation provides around 35% of
the annual electricity demand). Reductions in the PV panel costs affect mainly the annualised
energy savings for consumers, which increase from 12% to 22% for the considered range of PV
costs.
Regarding the area with storage, it is possible to observe a notably impact on the installation
sizes caused by reductions in PV panels costs and/or reductions in battery costs. Indeed, an
increase in both the optimal PV capacity and storage energy capacity can be observed, reaching
more than 2.25 kW of PV per household, and a maximum of around 5 kWh of storage per
household for very low technology costs. Self-sufficiency ratio increases accordingly, up to 80%.
In particular, results show that SSR is increased by 1% every -3 e/kWh in storage costs or every
-18 e/kW in PV panels costs. It is also worth noting that rooftop occupation (not shown in
the figure) also increases, reaching a maximum of 60% for the considered cost ranges. Indeed, in
an scenario of very-low technology costs, optimal self-consumption installations would require an
extensive use of the available rooftop. Concerning economic performance, annualised savings also
increase notably (above 30%).
6.1.2 Case 2: Compensation for energy surplus, according to RD 244
Figure 6 shows the results obtained for different technology costs assuming a compensation for
energy surplus.
As expected, for the same PV and battery costs, the annualised savings increase dramatically in
comparison with the previous analysis, where no remuneration for energy exports was considered.
The border between the two regions (with and without storage) provides interesting information
regarding the impact of the remuneration policy on the configuration of the optimal installation,
as discussed below.
Focusing on the area without storage, a decrease of the PV costs lead to a significant increase of
the optimal PV capacity (from around 1 kW per household up to more than 3 kW per household).
However, the obtained self-sufficiency ratios show that PV represents around 40% of the electricity
consumption, regardless the PV panel cost. This can be explained from the fact that the SSR, in
the absence of storage, is determined by the overlapping between PV generation and consumption.
Therefore, after covering the demand, the additional PV capacity does not improve self-sufficiency,
although it is still cost-effective due to the remuneration paid for the exports. As a result, lower
PV costs decrease the self-consumption ratio (SCR) and increase the exported-imported ratio
(EIR). Interestingly, this effect is more pronounced for a range of PV costs from the maximum
considered (1,450 e/kW) down to 1,100 e/kW, for which EIR is below one. For PV panels
cost lower than 1,100 e/kW, the increase of optimal PV capacity is less pronounced. This can be
explained by the legislation constraints, which impose that, on a monthly basis, the economic value
of the exported electricity cannot overcome that of the imported electricity. Since exported and
imported electricity are valued with different prices (details provided in Section 7), it is possible
to observe EIR above 100%.
Considering the cases where storage becomes viable, two meaningful insights can be observed:
First, storage is only included in the optimal installation for battery costs below 140 e/kWh; in
addition, this threshold varies with the assumed PV panel costs. Second, reductions in the PV
panel costs favour the inclusion of batteries only in a PV cost range (above 1,100 e/kW). Further
reductions in PV costs lead to lower storage adoption.
This can be explained by looking at economics of the PV surplus, which can be either stored in
a battery or fed into the grid. Storing in a battery implies consuming the PV surplus later at the
value of the electricity rate, affected by the round-trip efficiency of the battery, i.e. 0.95× 0.95 =
0.9. In contrast, feeding PV into the grid implies selling the surplus immediately at a lower rate -
as shown later in section 7, in 2018 this value was around 46% of the energy rate (meaning that for
every kWh fed into the grid, the economic compensation allows for importing 0.46 kWh from the
grid with no cost). This means that storage offers a higher value to the PV surplus than the grid
13
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis of technology costs for case “With compensation for energy surplus”.
Purple and cyan areas indicate that the optimal solutions comprise only PV panels, and PV panels
plus batteries, respectively. Yellow iso-lines refer to the metric indicate in the title of the plot.
(corresponding the difference between 0.9 and 0.46), but it implies an additional investment cost.
Results show that, for low PV technology costs, these battery investments are not worthwhile and
the PV surplus is valued at the grid export rate. Conversely, when PV technology costs increase,
the most cost-effective configuration includes storage, as associated investments are compensated
by the higher remuneration obtained for PV surplus. Finally, as seen in the previous analysis,
when PV technology costs are very high, the PV surplus is not cost-effective neither with storage
nor with the grid rate, which means a decrease in both grid exports and storage investments.
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6.2 Sensitivity analysis of the discount rate
In this section, the sensitivity of the optimal installation with respect to the discount rate, r is
discussed. For renewable energy systems, the discount rate typically has a remarkable impact on
the Annualised Energy Cost (AEC), as energy projects are characterised by high capital costs, CC,
a long lifetime, L, and relatively low operational and maintenance costs, OM . These parameters
are related according to the following expression:
AEC = CC
r
1− (1 + r)−L
+OM. (2)
Given this, considering for example L = 20 years and OM = 0, the AEC of a project corre-
sponding to a scenario with r = 3% is more than 20% higher than the obtained with r = 1%.
This gives an idea on the extent to which results can be affected by this parameter. [41] already
highlighted the impact of discount rates for utility-scale PV installations.
For the case of a self-consumption installation, the AEC includes cash flows due to imports
from/exports to the grid. For the case of an installation including PV and inverter but no batteries,
the AEC is given by:
AEC = Cimports −Rexports + CCPV
r
1− (1 + r)−LPV
+ CCInv
r
1− (1 + r)−LInv
, (3)
where Cimports is the annual cost associated with energy imports from the grid, and Rexports is the
remuneration due to exports to the grid. From this, it is clear that variations in the discount rate,
r, are equivalent to changes in the capital costs of PV (panel+labour cost) and inverter, while
Cimports and Rexports depend on the sizing of the installation (which in turn depends on PV and
inverter capital costs) and the considered remuneration policy.
Thus, for a discount rate of r = r0 +∆r, the equivalent capital costs with discount rate r0 for
PV and the inverter are given by:
CCPV,equiv = CCPV
(
r
r0
)
1− (1 + r0)
−LPV
1− (1 + r)−LPV
, (4)
and
CCInv,equiv = CCInv
(
r
r0
)
1− (1 + r0)
−LInv
1− (1 + r)−LInv
, (5)
respectively.
For the techno-economic parameters specified in Table 3 (in particular, r0 = 2%), differ-
ent discount rates between 0% and 5 % are actually equivalent to keeping discount rate at 2%
while considering a total capital cost (PV+Inverter+Installation) between 860 e/kWp and 1,300
e/kWp. Thus, the same results obtained in Section 6.1 for that cost range can also be attained
by considering a discount rate between 0% and 5%.
The high impact of the discount rate on the results indicates a possible strategy to incentive
rooftop PV installations. If public institutions implement programs that include low-interest loans
(even zero-interest loans), which will in practice reduce the discount rate, this would make rooftop
PV systems more cost-effective and attractive for household consumers.
In our opinion, the reason why self-consumption promotion policies should be oriented to
household consumers, with emphasis to those affected by energy poverty, is that regulatory frame-
works must ensure fair conditions for small and new actors. Adequate financing schemes could be
key to foster the needed emergence of distributed PV generation. Until now, power systems were
based on large generation plants, whose required investments that could only be afforded by very
large or state-owned companies. In Spain, as in many other countries, this led to the existence of
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very few large companies in the power sector. Distributed generation and self-consumption instal-
lations represent a paradigm shift, since they enable other stakeholders such as small businesses,
cooperatives and citizens to play a role in the power system. The deployment of renewables in
Germany [42] and Denmark [43] has resulted in a better distribution of generation property. To-
day, solar PV panels have reached such a low cost that distributed generation is competitive with
other centralised technologies. However, as dominant actors in the power system try to retain
their market power, changes in the current configuration of the system will not take place without
public support.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis of the PV panel lifetime
Following the reasoning detailed in Section 6.2, it is possible to relate variations in the PV panel
lifetime (LPV = LPV,0 + ∆LPV ) with an equivalent PV capital cost for the original lifetime
(LPV,0 ). This equivalent cost is given by:
CCPV,equiv = CCPV
1− (1 + r)−LPV,0
1− (1 + r)−LPV
. (6)
For the techno-economic parameters specified in Table 3 (in particular, LPV,0 = 20 years),
different PV panel lifetimes between 15 and 30 years are equivalent to keeping the life time at
20 years while considering a total capital cost (PV+Inverter+Installation) between 1,215 e/kWp
and 825 e/kWp, respectively. The sizing and performance of the optimal installation for this
range of total capital cost with a PV panel lifetime of 20 years was detailed in Section 6.1 for the
cases with and without remuneration for energy surplus.
7 A proposal for upgrading the solar compensation mech-
anisms
As introduced in Section 3, the new legal framework for self-consumption in Spain includes the
possibility to remunerate the exported energy, according to a net billing mechanism. A number of
different net billing schemes are currently implemented in different countries, following different
criteria: Time-of-use tariffs (the remuneration tariffs are determined either based on historical
data or in real time market prices), location-dependent tariffs (based on grid congestion at differ-
ent nodes) and tariffs following avoided cost of electricity generation (avoided carbon emissions,
avoided investments in transmission grid, avoided power losses, etc.) [44]. The new legal frame-
work in Spain defines a net billing scheme based on market prices. The remuneration consists of
a discount on the electricity bill, implemented in such a way that consumers pay for the difference
between the economic value of the energy consumed economic value of the energy exported to the
grid. This difference, on a monthly basis, cannot be negative.
In what follows, we refer the case for self-consumers with the regulated tariff PVPC, as the
case detailed in RD 244. Self-consumers in the free market have to establish private contracts
with their retailers in order to define the remuneration mechanism. However, in our opinion,
the mechanism described in RD 244 for the PVPC tariffs would set a reference frame for private
retailers, who most likely would offer different versions of that mechanism, resulting in similar
average remuneration prices. As a consequence, the mechanism for PVPC self-consumers would
apply de facto to all self-consumers.
The key point of the remuneration mechanism is that the referred economic value is computed
using differentiated prices for import and export energy, in which the latter is lower than the
former. This is so because the definition of the remuneration price does not include some system
cost components, for example, the energy losses due to electricity transmission and distribution.
In order to understand the different prices employed to assess the economic value of imported
and exported electricity, a brief description of the electricity price components in Spain is detailed
below.
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Figure 7 shows the PVPC tariff for consumers with no time discrimination, comprising a term
that depends on the contracted power (in a circle) and other that depends on the consumed
energy (in a box). The latter is broken down according to its different components. For those
components whose value is time dependent, an average for 2018 is shown in parentheses. The
access tariff (power and energy component) are shown in gray.
PMH (57.2 €/MWh)
SAH (2.6 €/MWh)
OC (7.9 €/MWh)
PERD (11.7 €/MWh)
TCU
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Figure 7: Components of the PVPC tariff depend on the contracted power (circle) and consumed
energy (box). The energy box includes the energy component of the access tariff (TEU ) and
energy production price (TCU ). The latter comprises the production cost (CP) and power losses
(PERD). See text for additional details. In parentheses, average values for 2018 for consumers
with no time discrimination tariff. Source: [30].
The energy term has two main components:4 the energy component of the access tariff (TEU ),
and the energy production price (TCU ). The TCU component includes the production cost (CP)
and the cost associated to power losses (PERD). The three components of CP correspond to the
day and intra-day electricity market prices, PMH, the adjustment services costs, SAH, and other
costs (OC), including TSO and market operator remunerations and capacity payments, among
others. The component related to power losses, PERD is computed as a percentage of CP. This
percentage used to be fixed to 14% in the past [45], but it became variable every hour with the
introduction of the PVPC tariff. Its average value in 2018 was above 17%.
With the previous description in mind, the remuneration mechanism for the energy surplus
described in RD 244 establishes that the economic value of the exported energy is computed using
PMH. The average value of the PMH in 2018 was 57.2 e/MWh. The resulting economic value
is subtracted from the economic value of the imported energy, for which TCU is employed. The
average value of TCU in 2018 was 79.3 e/MWh. In addition, the energy component of the access
tariff, TEU, is always added in the bill for the imported energy. The value of TEU in 2018 was
44.0 e/MWh. Thus, this mechanism establishes the following two factors on the energy surplus
remuneration (here quantified according to the average values of the electricity price components
for 2018):
• A constraint limiting the magnitude of the exported energy that is remunerated. For every
kWh imported from the grid, the self-consumer is allowed to export up to 79.3/52.2 = 1.52
kWh with remuneration (beyond that, exported energy is not remunerated).
• An assessment of the energy surplus remuneration. For every kWh injected into the grid,
the economic compensation allows the self-consumer to take 57.2/(79.3+ 44.0) = 0.46 kWh
free from the grid in the same tariff period.
The fact that SAH and OC components are not included in the remuneration price could be
reasonable to some extent, as self-consumers benefit from the adjustment services incurred in the
process of injecting energy and taking it back later (SAH ), and the other costs included in OC are
4The acronyms are the official ones, and correspond to the acronyms in Spanish.
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not avoided when injecting electricity surplus into the grid. Conversely, we find that removing the
PERD component from the remuneration price is hardly justified. The energy surplus injected
into the grid by a self-consumer, in a realistic scenario of distributed penetration of behind the
meter PV, would be used by another consumer located nearby, avoiding conventional generation
and, consequently, the associated losses due to energy transmission and distribution. However,
the near consumer that takes this energy surplus from the grid does pay the PERD component
included in the tariff. This payment represents a benefit for the system, as it is not refunded
to the self-consumer that injected the energy surplus because, according to RD 244, the PERD
component is excluded from the remuneration mechanism.
An accurate energy surplus remuneration policy should properly reward investments that in-
crease the efficiency of the system. In our opinion, this translates into including the value of the
avoided power losses, given by the PERD component, into the energy surplus remuneration. In or-
der to assess the impact of this proposal, an analysis considering the following three remuneration
policies for the energy surplus has been performed:
• P1 : “No remuneration”.
• P2 : “Remuneration”, according to RD 244.
• P3 : “Remuneration with losses”, proposed in this work, including the price component
PERD when computing the economic value of the energy surplus.
Figure 8 shows the main performance parameters for the three considered remuneration poli-
cies, obtained for the optimal self-consumption installations in every region in Spain, and also for
the average national building.
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Figure 8: Regional performance of the optimal self-consumption installation according to different
remuneration policies for energy surplus. P1 : No remuneration. P2 : Remuneration according to
RD 244. P3 : Remuneration including the value of avoided power losses.
From the economic point of view, as it could be expected, the proposed remuneration policy P3
would have a positive impact in all the territory. The Annualised Savings Ratio between policies
P2 and P3 increases in around 3-4% percentage points (except for the three northern regions,
where the ASR increases only around 1.5%).
The other three plots in Figure 8 reflect two sort of impacts of policy P3 in the different regions.
For southern regions, the size of the optimal installation (thus, the occupied fraction of roof and
the SSR) remains constant (or decreases slightly). This is so because, for these regions, the size of
the optimal installations under the remuneration policy P2 is determined by the legal constraint
concerning the exported energy. Thus, even if the remuneration for energy excess is increased
(policy P3 ), the optimal PV capacity does not increase because additional energy surplus would
not be remunerated. In fact, exports decrease a bit (see the plot on the right, EIR) because the
18
legal constraint makes reference to the economic value of exports, which is increased under policy
P3. Consequently, for these regions, the proposed remuneration policy P3 has little impact for the
optimal installation, but it has a positive impact from the economic point of view, as economic
savings increases. It is worth noting that this increase in the annualised savings does not have
extra cost to other consumers (self-consumer or not) or the administration. It comes as a mere
consequence of a proper assessment of the benefits derived from reducing electricity losses.
Concerning northern regions, policy P3 leads to an increase in the optimal PV capacity. Ac-
tually, both the SSR and the EIR increase notably. In a few cases, this increase in PV capacity
leads to roof occupation above 50% (with the particular case of Basque Country reaching 96%
of the average building roof surface). This means that, probably, in these regions, the optimal
self-consumption facility could only be installed in a portion of buildings; this does not necessarily
mean that self-consumption is not cost-effective, but that the installation performance would be
below the optimal one as a consequence of limited rooftop availability.
8 Conclusions
In this work self-consumption in energy communities under the new legal framework in Spain has
been analysed. A techno-economical optimisation performed with DER-CAM provided optimal
installations for every region in Spain. A first contribution was the identification and the combina-
tion of relevant databases concerning load profile (week and weekend days), hourly electricity price
(with and without time discrimination), regionally-resolved average building and solar resource. In
addition, updated technology costs (household PV costs around 1,000 e/kW) and several battery
technologies were considered.
Regional results showed that self-consumption is cost-effective in all the territory: the annu-
alised savings as compared with a situation without self-consumption ranged between 11-20% for
the case without remuneration for energy surplus, and 14-32% with remuneration. The identified
differences between northern and southern regions could be employed to define local policies in
order to encompass self-consumption cost-effectiveness at national level.
Sensitivity analysis on technology costs revealed that batteries still require noticeably cost
reductions to be included in the optimal self-consumption installation. In addition, solar compen-
sation mechanisms make batteries less attractive in a scenario of low PV costs, since feeding PV
surplus into the grid, yet less efficient, becomes more cost-effective.
The high impact of the discount rate on the results suggested the need for specific policies
(that could be implemented at national level or at the local level, taking into account the regional
differences encountered in this work) oriented to help deploy self-consumption while ensuring fair
conditions to small and new actors in the power system.
An important aspect of the research was the analysis of the remuneration policy for energy
surplus established in the new legal framework. A potential improvement was proposed, consisting
in the inclusion of the value of the avoided power losses in the surplus remuneration. This upgrade
of the legislation would allow for properly rewarding investments that increase the efficiency of
the system.
Finally, the regional scale of the analysis allowed us to reveal that, in central and southern
regions, the size of the optimal installation (for the case with remuneration) is determined by a
legal constraint imposing limitations on the amount of exported energy that is remunerated. This
is not the case for northern regions, for which the proposed upgrade of the remuneration policy
would lead to higher PV optimal capacities and self-sufficiency rates.
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